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On Being Imposed Upon By Artful or 
Designing Persons - The California 
Experience with the Involuntary 
Placement of the Aged 
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER* 
INTRODUCTION 
Under California law, a person is considered incompetent 
when "by reason of old age ... [he] is unable, unassisted, 
properly to manage and take care of himself or his property, and 
by reason thereof is likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful 
or designing persons."! 
As this provision of California law suggests, defenselessness 
in old age is often treated as incompetency. When the victim is 
younger, being imposed on by artful and designing persons is likely 
to be seen as a reason for taking action against those who have so 
• Dean and Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara Law School; 
A.B., 1953; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1959; LL.M., 1964; J.S.D., Yale 
Law School, 1969. The author would like to thank his research associate, 
Christopher Heard, for his assistance. 
1. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1460 (West 1956). For a similar definition of in­
competency, see CAL. PROB. CODE § 1751 (West Supp. 1977). 
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victimized. With old age, a new response creeps in: holding the 
victim incompetent, managing his or her property, and often pro­
viding enforced institutionalization. 
I have referred to the aged as the least militant minority.:! 
Passage of life slows physical functioning. That in turn provides 
others an excuse for wresting control of a person's life and dimin­
ishes the victim's capacity to resist. Consequently, it is not surpris­
ing that old people in our society are often wards of their own 
wealth and "patients" in hospitals and nursing homes in which they 
see themselves as prisoners. These two problems-wardship and 
involuntary hospitalization-are inseparable. Both provisions re­
spond to the aged person's infirmity by depriving him or her of the 
right to manage property and/or liberty. Surrogate management of 
the ward's property may unfairly advantage the beneficiaries of the 
ward's wealth.3 This article is principally concerned with the 
deprivation of liberty inherent in forced placement. However, this 
article will concentrate on California surrogate management stand­
ards because they provide a better frame of reference for the 
assumptions which underlie various types of involuntary interven­
tions, and because they are closer to the open-ended commitment 
statutes of many other states. 
It is customary to distinguish involuntary hospitalization from 
other forms of forced placement, such as placement associated with 
homes. While the level of deprivation of rights may vary with the 
type of placement, both types of placement have much in common 
and will therefore be treated together in this article. 
Both involuntary placement and surrogate property manage­
ment are products of a paternalistic philosophy akin to the attitude 
of elders toward children. In this instance, however, the paternal­
ism experienced by elders is a product of their children and society. 
If there is no vengeance in the role reversal, there is at least 
comparably harsh discipline. The treatment accorded cannot be 
justified ethically. Moreover, it raises serious constitutional ques­
tions, and may itself be seriously contra-indicated from a medical 
perspective. 
STANDARDS FOR INVOLUNTARY INTERVENTION 
The aged are not unique in being subject to surrogate man­
agement of property and involuntary hospitalization. Likewise, 
2. Alexander, Foreword: Life, Liberty, and Property Rights for the 
Elderly, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 267 (1975). 
3. See, e.g., Alexander, Surrogate Management of the Property of the 
Aged, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 91 (1969). 
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my opposition to surrogate management and involuntary hospitali­
zation is not limited to their imposition on the aged. Nonetheless, 
older people are among the most pitiful of involuntary patients. 
Although there is wide statutory variance, most states provide 
procedures for intervention in the lives of the elderly for purposes 
of managing their property.4 The statute usually provides a proce­
dure for surrogate management which does not depend on old age, 
but which makes old age a factor militating toward involuntary 
intervention. Standards such as "old age," "senility," "extreme old 
age," "physical and mental weakness on account of old age," or 
"mental infirmities of old age" are quite common.5 
Although surrogate management does not automatically lead 
to involuntary placement, there appears to be incredible overlap 
between the two. Many states still retain relatively open-ended 
involuntary commitment statutes which allow involuntary treat­
ment of those who are in need of treatment. In those states, old 
age militates toward a finding of that need. Thus, in both commit­
ment and surrogate management, aging makes one more amenable 
to involuntary process. 
To the extent that the criteria for involuntary commitment 
and those for declaration of incompetency differ, the standards for 
incompetency tend to be more encompassing. The California 
incompetency provisions are chosen for discussion here primarily 
for that reason. Moreover, incompetency is often the first step 
toward involuntary hospitalization. 
The language of the California Probate Code is typical." 
While this commitment statute only provides for involuntary place­
ment of persons who are either dangerous or so gravely disabled as 
to be unable to provide for their basic needs, the conservatorship 
provision reached a broader group-those people who cannot 
manage their affairs unassisted. In addition, the statute vaguely 
suggests a relationship between that functional inability and old 
age. It also implies that there is a relationship between that 
inability and being deceived or imposed upon by artful and design­
ing persons. No doubt both qualifications help slightly to limit 
4. Id. at 98-1'28. 
5. Id. at 130. 
6. See text accompanying note 1 supra. 
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the statute since most people could be accused of being unable 
properly to manage their affairs unassisted. 
The former qualification requires no further examination. It 
is obviously a product of an assumption that older people are more 
likely to need surrogate managers than others. Yet, the second 
qualification tends to obscure the fact that the provision may not 
protect those who cannot manage their affairs. Rather, it protects 
their heirs and keepers from the overreaching of third parties. If 
the standard were intended to be solicitous only of the potential 
ward, it would end at a finding of the ward's need. Instead, the 
standard apparently focuses on the dynamics of the ward's relation­
ship with others. In the case of a needy person, money spent on 
new friends deprives both the heirs of a wealthy person and the 
state of resources. As thus structured, incompetency proceedings 
are, in reality, adversary proceedings in which the petitioner may 
vindicate his or her personal interest, rather than the interest of the 
ward.7 In both incompetency proceedings and involuntary com­
mitment proceedings, the law is cast as though only the ward's 
benefit were in issue. In actuality, the petitioner frequently has a 
great deal at stake. The proceedings are not designed to and do 
not in fact examine the petitioner's interest. Consequently, the 
proceedings lend themselves to abuse by favoring petitioners to the 
disadvantage of the ward. 
In California, there has been a recent mood of reform with 
respect to intervention, involuntary commitment, and conserva­
torship/guardianship. Even before the adoption of the Lanter­
man-Petris-Short Act in 1969, section 5571 of the California 
Welfare and Institutions Code provided that U[n]o case of harm­
less chronic mental unsoundness or mental deficiency shall be 
committed to the Department of Mental Hygiene for placement in 
any state hospital for the care and treatment of the mentally ill."s 
Nonetheless, the Assembly Subcommittee on Mental Health found 
that these old people-presumably the ones described in section 
5571-represented a disproportionate percentage of state hospital 
residents.9 
Concerned about that fact and about other abuses in involun­
tary commitment, the legislature passed the Lanterman-Petris-
7. See G. ALEXANDER & T. LEWIN, THE AGED AND THE NEED FOR SURRO­
GATE MANAGEMENT (1972); Alexander, note 2 supra. 
8. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5571 (West 1966) (repealed 1969). 
9. ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, SUBCOMM. ON 
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Short Act in 1969.10 Prior law allowed persons to be involuntarily 
hospitalized because they were in need of supervision, treatment, 
care or restraint. The new bill replaced this language with only 
two general provisions for confinement of mentally ill persons for 
longer than emergency seventy-two hour incarceration: "danger 
to others" and "danger to self".u Both provisions were restrictively 
defined.12 The new law also added a provision for the hospitaliza­
tion of those who are gravely disabled, defining grave disability as 
"[a] condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder, 
is unable to provide for his basic personal needs for food, clothing 
or shelter."13 The rigor of grave disability conservatorships stood 
in bold relief to conservatorships established under the California 
Probate Code.14 
During 1977, probate conservatorships were altered by the Lan­
terman bill incorporating much of the philosophy of the Lanter­
man-Petris-Short Act into the Probate Code. A study by the 
National Senior Citizens Center had determined that eighty per­
cent of persons for whom conservatorship had been ordered were 
over sixty-five. In addition, they found that ninety-three percent 
of these people had been conserved without their appearance in 
court. Finally, the study noted that ninety-seven percent had been 
conserved without legal representation in the proceedings.1o The 
new bill was designed to assure that the elderly would no longer be 
the objects of such casual deprivations of their liberty. As the 
Lanterman-Fetris-Short Act had done before it, the new Lanter­
man bill establishes strong procedural safeguards against improper­
ly obtained conservatorships. Chief among these safeguards is a 
MENTAL HEALTH, THE Dn.EMMA OF MENTAL COMMITMENTS IN CALIFORNIA, A 
BACKGROUND DOCUMENT 78 (1976). 
10. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5401 (West 1972). 
11. Id. § 5250. 
12. Id. §§ 5260, 5300. 
13. Id. § 5008(h) (amended 1976). See id. § 5008(h) (West Supp. 1977) 
for further additions to this statutory provision. 
14. Id. §§ 5350-5368 (West 1972). 
15. The National Senior Citizens Center is a federally funded legal ser­
vices center concerned with the legal problems of the elderly poor. The 
study cited above was an empirical study covering the complete Los 
Angeles County central district guardianship and conservatorship filings 
under CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1460-1470 (West 1956) and CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 
1701-2207 (West Supp. 1977) from July 1, 1973 to June 30, 1974. Included 
in this research was an individual examination of 1,010 case files. 
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provision which prohibits, in most circumstances, the granting of 
orders of conservatorship or guardianship in the absence of the 
ward.16 Another provision requires a court investigator to visit the 
proposed ward in those infrequent circumstances where the ward is 
certified as unable to attend the hearing.17 Finally, review provi­
sions for conservatorships and guardianships are more stringent 
than those under prior law, and notice and hearing provisions are 
strengthened.1s 
As mentioned above, the conservatorship/guardianship provi­
sions are related to involuntary commitment of the elderly.10 The 
tests themselves, and the arguments surrounding their adoption, 
are instructive of involuntary placement issues. Under the new 
bill, the vague standards which allowed the appointment of guardi­
ans and conservators to such things as infirmities of old age have 
been abolished. The new law makes clear that the standard is 
functional and non-medical. The precise wording was the result 
of a compromise between the State Bar Legal Services representa­
tives and representatives of the State Bar Committee on Probate 
and Trust. On the one hand, the Legal Services members insisted 
on limiting the standar� for intervention to those aspects of dys­
function which directly relate to providing food, clothing and 
shelter. On the other hand, the Probate and Trust people strongly 
insisted on retaining much of the prior language, especially the 
provisions regarding deception by artful or designing persons. 
The "artful and designing persons" test was not unique to 
California.20 Moreover, the test was often difficult to employ.21 
This standard is based on a belief that it is important to intervene 
in the lives of older people, even though those people may be able 
to manage their own lives. One authority has commented that 
[t]hese [old] people . . .  cannot be judged to be incompetent. They 
know what they are doing, they want to do just what they are do­
ing, and to live the way they are living. Still, from our present 
16. 1976 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv., ch. 1357, § 6, at 94-96 (amending CAL. 
PROB. CODE § 1461 (West 1956». 
17. Id. § 7, at 96-97 (amending CAL. PROB. CODE § 1461.1 (West 1956». 
18. Id. §§ 11-13, at 99-100 (amending CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1470-1472 (West 
1956». 
19. See text accompanying notes 4-9 supra. 
20. Alexander, supra note 3, at 129. 
21. The courts have disagreed over the interpretations to be given 
the property management standard. It has been held to mean any­
thing from rationally, to that of ordinary reasonable care, to a com­
parative community standard, to an ability to manage it in a ra­
tional manner, to an ability to manage it intelligently, to a disposi­
tion of mind which might lead to the wasting away of an estate. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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sociological way of thinking they need care, some of them their 
estates, most of them their persons.22 
Although Probate and Trust representatives insisted that the 
"artful and designing persons " language be retained in the new 
law, the final bill entirely excluded it from consideration in the 
granting of guardianships. As an alternative ground to the ap­
pointment of a conservator, the bill included novel language which 
allows such appointment when a person is considered "substantial­
ly unable to manage his own financial resources or resist fraud or 
undue influence."23 The law limits the application of the new 
standard by providing that isolated instances of fraud or undue 
influence should not suffice as proof of incapacity. 0 
In this respect, the old and new laws differ substantially. The 
old law allowed predictions of future conduct under its susceptible 
to infZuence standard.24 The new law requires proof of present 
functional inability.25 Prior law did not require even a single 
instance of improvidence-only a likelihood of future improvident 
behavior.26 The new statute not only requires present improvid­
ence but also mandates that improvidence be demonstrated by more 
than isolated instances of conduct. Even more significantly, in my 
view, the new law requires that the proposed ward be the focus of 
functional inability, rather than those who deal with him. 
The prior law's concern for old age and artful or designing 
persons forced courts to focus on third parties rather than on the 
ward. Since courts neither understand the process of aging nor the 
notion of mental debility, the language itself probably provided 
strong suggestions as to grounds for declaration of incompetency. 
If a judge were in doubt as to whether a person was able properly 
to manage, the language of the statute provided that people might 
be unable to manage because of diseases, weak mind, or by reason 
of old age. 
Consider the "artful and designing persons" language. It encour­
aged the judge to focus on persons other than the proposed ward or 
22. McAvinchey, The Not-Quite-Incompetent Incompetent, 95 Tn. & EST. 
872, 873 (1956). 
23. CAL. FROB. CODE § 1751 (West 1956) (amended 1977). 
24. Id. §§ 1460, 1751. 
25. Id. § 1751 (West Supp. 1977). 
26. Id. (West 1956). See aZso In re Cassidy's Guardianship, 95 Cal. App. 
641, 273 P. 69 (1928). 
1089 
HeinOnline -- 14 San Diego L. Rev. 1090 1976-1977
the petitioner. Who? Daddy's young girlfriend? Mother's hair� 
dresser? A new religious figure or charity? At the same time, 
that language directed the judge's attention from the possible best 
interests of the petitioner. 
Efforts of near relatives are not the only interests which can be 
protected by intervention in the life of an older person. In one 
study, it was found that the state of New York was the largest 
petitioner for incompetency.27 Similarly, a Los Angeles study 
suggests that a large percentage of incompetency proceedings 
brought against the aged poor are brought by the state of Califor� 
nia.28 Although the state is probably less interested than are the 
aged persons' children in preventing the aged from forming new 
alliances, the state has an interest in insuring the preservation of 
whatever resources exist less it have to expend its own funds. 
Moreover, the state may have administrative concerns which can be 
managed more effectively if someone has the legal right to make 
decisions for the elderly person.29 To the extent that incompeten� 
cy proceedings are used by the state to provide an easy mechanism 
for paying government services or insuring that assets remain 
stable, the state, like other petitioners, promotes its own interest 
rather than those of the ward. 
In other states which have not adopted the relatively strict 
involuntary commitment standards adopted by California, the de� 
bate over surrogate management procedure may more closely par� 
allel disputes directly concerning involuntary commitment. 
A CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED MINIMUM STANDARD? 
For a long time, it had apparently been assumed that there were 
no serious constitutional questions concerning involuntary place� 
ment, presumably because it was conceived to be in the ward's 
interest. In O'Connor v. Donaldson,3!J the United States Supreme 
Court suggested otherwise. Petitioner in Donaldson successfully 
sued for damages resulting from fifteen years of court ordered 
incarceration in a mental hospital. He argued that he had not 
been dangerous to himself or to others, and that he was capable of 
surviving outside of a mental institution. In addition, he alleged 
that he had not been treated during his confinement. 
27. G. ALEXANDER & T. LEWIN, supra note 7, at 12. 
28. See note 15 supra. 
29. See, e.g., Wilkie v. O'Connor, 261 App. Div. 373, 25 N.Y.S.2d 617 
(1941). 
30. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
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The Court ultimately held that " [a] State cannot constitutional­
ly confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable 
of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing 
and responsible family members or friends.":n California's invol­
untary commitment law provides that a person may be placed 
under a Lanterman-Petris-Short conservatorship if he or she is 
gravely disabled.32 The statutory "grave disability"33 criterion 
appears to be more stringent than the Supreme Court's test. How­
ever, as applied, the opposite is true. According to Donaldson, it 
is significant that a person's survival outside a mental institution 
may depend on relatives or friends without impairing his or her 
constitutional right to release.34 The "gravely disabled" provisions 
of the California statute still await authoritative interpretation by 
the courts. However, the provisions have been applied by trial 
courts to persons who would clearly have been adequately cared for 
by others but were incapable of providing that care without assist­
ance. If the Supreme Court's language is to be taken at face value, 
such an interpretation by the California trial courts apparently 
violates fourteenth amendment due process. It may seem strange 
that, in defining "gravely disabled," the clear language of the 
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act could be interpreted so expansively. 
Looking to legislative history, the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act re­
placed the law under which one could be involuntarily confined in 
a mental institution if in need of "supervision, treatment, care or 
restraint."35 Grave disability was expressly designed to eliminate 
the vagaries of that broad language. Both constitutional interpre­
tation and statutory draftsmanship seemed intent on insuring that 
those who could function in safety to themselves and others outside 
of mental institutions would not be involuntarily incarcerated. 
Yet, as is characteristic of involuntary commitment, a combina­
tion of prejudice, superstition, confusion and awe of medical diag­
nosis continues in practice what appears to have been prohibited by 
law. The Supreme Court used strong language: 
A finding of "mental illness" alone cannot justify a State's locking 
a person up against his wil and keeping him indefinitely in sim-
31. Id. at 576. 
32. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5350 (West 1972). 
33. See text accompanying note 13 supra for the statutory definition of 
grave disability. 
34. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). 
35. THE DILEMMA OF MENTAL COMMITMENT, supra note 9, at 38, quoting 
former CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5550 (West 1966) (repealed 1968). 
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pIe custodial confinement. Assuming that that term can be given 
a reasonably precise content and that the "mentally ill" can be 
identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no constitutional 
basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous 
to no one and can live safely in freedom. 
May the State confine the mentally il merely to insure them a 
living standard superior to that they enjoy in the private com­
munity? That the State has a proper interest in providing care and 
assistance to the unfortunate goes without saying. But the mere 
presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person from prefer­
ring his home to the comforts of an institution. Moreover, while 
the State may arguably confine a person to save him from harm, 
incarceration is !rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising the 
living standards of those capable of surviving safely in freedom, 
on their own or with the help of family or friends. . . . 
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save 
its citizens from exposure to those whose ways are different? One 
might as well ask if the State, to avoid public unease, could incar­
cerate all who are physically unattractive or socially eccentric. 
Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify 
the deprivation of a person's physical liberty.36 
Unfortunately, the Court was confronted with a jury finding that 
petitioner was not mentally ill or, if mentally ill, had not received 
treatment. Therefore the Court was not required to decide the 
constitutionality of a statutory provision providing for involuntary 
incarceration of people in need of treatment.37 This is important, 
because the district court had found that "[a] person who is 
involuntarily civilly committed to a mental hospital does have a 
constitutional right to receive such treatment as will give him a 
realistic opportunity to be cured, . . ,"38 
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger noted that the Su­
preme Court had not adopted the trial court's statement.30 Ac­
cording to the Chief Justice, it is not clear that treatment is a 
concomitant obligation to incarceration. The problem, as he sees 
it, is principally a question of the extent of the parens patriae 
power.40 Chief Justice Burger realized that mental illness is a 
fuzzy concept when applied to law. He recognized that there is 
considerable debate regarding the definition of mental disease and 
what constitutes treatment. In addition, he noted that there are 
many areas of so-called mental illness for which effective therapy 
does not exist. Finally, the Chief Justice acknowledged the uncer­
tainty of diagnosis and the paradox that "it is universally recog-
36. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575- (1975). 
37. Id. at 573. 
38. Id. at 57G n.6 (emphasis added). 
39. Id. at 580 (Burger, C.J., concurring), 
40. Id. at -583-84. 
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nized as fundamental to effective therapy that the patient acknowl­
edge his illness and cooperate with those attempting to give 
treatment; yet the failure of a large proportion of mentally ill 
persons to do so is a common phenomenon."41 
According to Chief Justice Burger, the question does not turn on 
further refinement of medical evidence. Instead, he inquires 
whether there are persons who are "unable to function in society 
and will suffer real harm to themselves unless provided with care in 
a sheltered environment."42 If there are such persons, then he 
believes the legislature has the power to provide for their involun­
tary protection. 
Whether one accepts the Chief Justice's approach or that of the 
district court makes a great deal of difference, although that differ­
ence would not affect the result in Donaldson. The petitioner's 
claim was on the absence of treatment, although petitioner did not 
concede that treatment was a sufficient justification for involuntary 
hospitalization. The Chief Justice insisted on a far higher stan­
dard for involuntary hospitalization, but would allow hospital con­
finement without treatment. In fact, the petitioner, a Christian 
Scientist, refused treatment. The Court apparently did not adjudi­
cate the queston of how the defect in petitioner's case could be 
remedied. If Chief Justice Burger's reasoning were followed, the 
remedy would appear to lie in legislative articulation of standards 
under which one can be adjudged so helpless as to require protec­
tive shelter. If the district court's path were chosen, the state 
would simply have to provide effective treatment. That, in turn, 
would seem principally to require an increase in the budget of state 
institutions in order to provide greater contact between patients 
and professionals. 
If one accepts the latter viewpoint, the so-called patient's rights 
to be treated becomes more a duty to treat him. At the same time, 
it becomes a sufficient justification to disregard his or her wishes 
not to be treated. In rejecting this notion, the Chief Justice 
mentioned that: 
Rather than inquiring whether strict standards of proof or periodic 
redetermination of a patient's condition are required in civil con-
41. Id. at 584. 
42. Id. 
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finement, the theory accepts the absence of such safeguards but in­
sists that the State provide benefits which, in the view of the court, 
are adequate "compensation" for confinement. In light of the wide 
divergence of medical opinion regarding the diagnosis of and the 
proper therapy for mental abnormalities, that prospect is especially 
troubling . . . . 43 
Although Donaldson applies directly to involuntary commitment 
in mental hospitals, it may have broader application as well. As has 
previously been noted, while involuntary incarceration exists, so­
called "voluntary " hospitalization may in fact be involuntarily im­
posed on threat of formal involuntary commitment.44 Assuming 
this proposition to be accurate, some of the considerations mentioned 
in Donaldson might spill over to "voluntary hospitalization." 
In addition, conservatorships raise similar issues even when, as 
in California, a sharp line is drawn between conservatorships which 
lead to involuntary hospitalization-legal only under Lanterman­
Petris-Short commitment standards-and probate conservator­
ships. Moreover, until July 1977, California will allow imposition 
of a guardianship on an old person who is unable to properly care, 
"unassisted, " for himself or his property.45 It seems strange that 
old age coupled with the inability properly to manage should 
suffice as a reason for the appointment of a conservator. 
The loss of control of one's property on the appointment of a 
conservator is, of course, the most obvious consequence of that 
appointment.46 A somewhat less recognized consequence is the 
ability of a conservator to determine the place in which the con­
servatee will reside.47 Although California law prohibits forcing 
one's ward to live in a mental institution, that prohibition is rare in 
other states. Moreover, even in California, the ability to confine 
the conservatee to a place in which he or she may not want to live 
seems to impose some of the restraints of liberty discussed in 
Donaldson. It is improbable that a court would enforce the con­
servator's requirement that the ward live in a certain place by 
punishing the ward's refusal to do so. It seems likely, however, 
that the court would allow the conservator to use economic coer­
cion in designating the ward's residence. Because the constitution-
43. rd. at 587. 
44. The author has interviewed a number of psychiatrists who have 
stated that they routinely use the threat of involuntary process to hold 
"voluntary" patients whom they fear to release. 
45. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1751 (West Supp. 1977). 
46. I have written a book on this issue and will not belabor the point 
here. See G. ALEXANDER & T. LEWIN, note 7 supra. 
47. CAL. PROB. CODE § 11351 (West Supp. 1977). 
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ality of involuntary hospitalization has only recently become of 
interest to most courts, it is not surprising to find scant authority on 
the issue of whether the Constitution protects one's right to choose 
his location of residence. Hence, it is not clear whether requiring a 
person to live in an unlocked ward within a private hospital is as 
onerous a requirement as that he or she live behind lock and key. 
The distinction may be academic to a patient unable to afford rent 
outside of the hospital because a conservator controls his or her 
money. 
Present California guardianship law appears suspect to the ex­
tent that residence provisions can be brought within the Donaldson 
holding. The California statute requires a person to be able to 
care for himself or his property "unassisted, " 48 whereas the Don­
aldson standard requires that one take into account the help of 
family and friends.49 The new law50 will alter the unassisted 
management provision by eliminating the word unassisted. 51 Of 
course, that still leaves open the possibility of adopting the vagaries 
of interpretation to the "gravely disabled" clause which continually 
plagued the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. 
DOES INVOLUNTARY PLACEMENT HELP? 
This article has so far been chiefly concerned with the ethical 
and constitutional objections to involuntary treatment of the aged. 
In addition, it seems appropriate to briefly review some clinical 
evidence of the impact of involuntary placement. As I have 
mentioned earlier, the aged are overrepresented in the population 
of involuntary mental patients. Professor Regan has observed that 
"the percentage of mental hospital first admissions of elderly per­
sons is increasing more rapidly than the total population of 
the aged" and that the aged make up thirty percent of men­
al hospital patients.52 It is unclear to what extent these sta-
48. Id. § 1460 (West 1956). 
49. See text accompanying note 31 supra. 
50. The new law becomes effective on July 1,1977. See CAL. PROB. CODE 
§ 1460 (West Supp. 1977). 
51. Id. 
52. Regan, Protective Services for the Elderly: Commitment, Guardian­
ship, and Alternatives, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 569, l}74 (19-72) (footnote 
omitted). 
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tistics simply reflect increased debility in the aged. Also un­
known is the number of patients who have non-psychiatric medical 
problems. Unfortunately, as is true of much of psychiatric diagno­
sis, non-psychiatric diagnoses tend to reflect the expectations of 
those who bring patients to the diagnostician. "Dad is just not 
himself." "Mom is so much more forgetful." "Dad's leg is giving 
him so much more trouble." These and similar statements provide 
a strong impression for a physician who may not have previously 
seen the patient and who has had experience with patients who 
were out of touch with their own functioning. 
One of the most common diagnoses is acute or chronic brain 
syndrome. Brain syndrome is considered acute if reversible and 
chronic if otherwise. The disorder is typically thought to be an 
organic dysfunction. Acute brain syndrome may, however, mask 
such physical or mental conditions as simple depression, vitamin 
deficiency, traumatic injury, or a variety of other ills. If the 
underlying condition is not treated, deterioration may in fact con­
firm the original diagnosis of brain syndrome. 53 A brain syn­
drome diagnosis, in general, and certainly a chronic brain syn­
drome diagnosis, in particular, may be a self-fulfilling prophecy. In 
addition, the diagnosis may mask needed treatment in a less dra­
matic way. For example, a colleague recently discussed a situation 
in which his mother had suffered a stroke. She made a miraculous 
recovery; all but bladder function returned to normal. The treating 
physician was pleased, so pleased in fact that it did not occur to 
him to investigate the cause of the remaining problem. At my 
colleague's insistence, the physician eventually diagnosed the con­
dition. He found a massive infection which quickly responded to 
treatment. The patient was cured of all symptoms. 
Much of the initial data on which mental health diagnosticians 
act in these cases concerns behavior.1H The symptomatology of 
brain syndrome is that a previously healthy individual suddenly 
becomes disturbed, confused, restless, or disoriented. Gr; Because a 
significant portion of chronic brain syndrome diagnosis is compar­
ative, data must be matched against the patient's prior mental 
history. Most of the behavioral symptoms on which a decision 
must be made will already have taken place by the time the 
53. See, e.g., Busse, Mental Disorder in Later Life-Organic Brain Syn­
drome, in MENTAL ILLNESS IN LATER LIFE 89 (E. Busse & E. Pfeiffer eds. 
1973); Goldfarb, Memory & Aging, in THE PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY OF 
HUMAN AGING 149 (R. Goldman & M. Rockstein eds. 1975). 
54. Busse, Mental Disorder in Later Life, supra note 53, at 89. 
55. Regan, note 52 supra. 
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physician sees the patient. Therefore, heavy reliance must be 
placed on an informer's observation of the person's conduct. The 
opportunity for bias on the informer's part is obvious. Just as an 
incompetency proceeding can be used to indicate the petitioner's 
interest in the finances of an older person, so too can information 
about the older person's behavior be used to cast him or her as 
sufficiently debilitated to require involuntary treatment. 
I do not suggest that the informant must necessarily be conscious 
of his or her role, or that he or she must necessarily be lying. The 
entire inquiry is sufficiently unclear that it is possible to paint a 
picture of gross disability simply by the selective recollections, 
however innocent, of recent events. The diagnosis in turn reflects 
the same vague standards. Wang reports that 77.7% of first time 
geriatric admissions in the year he studied were admitted for brain 
syndrome.56 Another study of diagnoses of patients over sixty-five 
on first admissions to mental hospitals in Toronto, New York and 
London found the respective percentages to be 41.8% in Canada, 
79.8% in New York and 42.8% in England. The study conclud­
ed that the difference in percentages was probably not the result of 
differences in patients but rather differences in the diagnostic bias 
of United States physicians.57 In Canada and England, the per­
centages of functional (non-organic) disorders were comparably 
higher. Because there is wide textbook difference between non­
organic dysfunction and organic brain syndrome, these discrepan­
cies indicate some reason for skepticism about chronic brain syn­
drome diagnoses. 
Apparently the early experience in California under Lanterman-
Petris-Short confirms this belief. One group has noted, 
Some mentally disO'l'dered patients were placed involuntarily in 
locked facilities under the diagnosis of chronic brain syndrome and 
were not provided the opportunity for judicial review of the invol­
untary hold. The locked facilities licensed by the state DMH 
[California Department of Mental Health] were generally used to 
56. Wang, Organic Brain Syndromes, in BEHAVIOR AND ADAPTATION IN 
LATE LIFE 263, 265 (E. Busse & E. Pfeiffer eds. 1969). 
57. Duckworth & Ross, Diagnostic Differences in Psychogeriatric Patients 
in Toronto, New York and London, England,' 112 CAN. MED. A. J. 847 
(1975). For a similar study with equally disturbing results, see Copeland, 
Kelleher, & Kellett, Diagnostic Differences in Psychogeriatric Patients in 
London and New York: United Kingdom-United States Diagnostic Project, 
19 CAN. PSYCHIATRIC A. J. 267 (1974). 
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provide care for the geriatric, senile patient who would otherwise 
wander out into the community, and needed a protective setting 
to prevent harm from coming to him because of his condition of 
incompetency. The diagnosis of chronic brain syndrome was con­
sidered to be an irreversible condition from which the patient 
would not "clear" or improve. In actual practice, some patients 
so placed in these facilities with a diagnosis of chronic brain syn­
drome became "clear", and did improve. A number of professional 
persons were concerned that the mentally disordered were being 
placed in locked facilities and forgotten rather than being placed 
in a protective, but not locked facility such as a board-and-care 
home.u8 
Throughout this article it has been assumed that the principal 
reason for intervention in an old person's life was not because of 
danger to himself or others but rather because of his or her 
debility. Consequently, it seems appropriate to examine the extent 
to which intervention is helpful to that person in living out his or 
her life. One study, whiTe concluding that the most traumatic 
form of protective service was involuntary placement, attempted to 
discern the efficacy of all protective services, not just involuntary 
placement.59 The study went on to note, however, that service 
increases the likelihood of institutionalization: "[e]xperienced 
social workers appear to have a strong tendency to move old people 
into 'protective settings' when assigned responsibility for their wel­
fare."6o The initial study found that, as to all protective 
services: "[o]ne must conclude on the basis of data gathered 
from following up ... service and control cases the project service 
was not effective in slowing down deterioration and physical func­
tioning-two major reasons frequently given for intervening in a 
protective case."61 The study's alarming conclusion was that pro­
tective services did not lengthen life. On the contrary, these 
services appeared to shorten people's lives. The hypothesis was 
restudied and reconfirmed. At the conclusion of the second study 
the author noted: 
Taking the findings as a whole it is difficult to avoid the conclusion 
that (a) participants in the experimental service program were in­
stitutionalized earlier than they would have otherwise been and 
(b) that this earlier institutionalization did not-contTary to intent 
-prove protective in terms of survival of the older person although 
it did relieve collaterals and community agents.1I2 
58. ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA's NEW MENTAL 
HEALTH LAW 159 (1972). 
59. BENJAMIN ROSE INSTITUTE, PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR OLDER PEOPLE: 
FINDINGS FROM THE BENJAMIN ROSE INSTITUTE STUDY (1974). 
60. Id. at 138. 
61. BENJAMIN ROSE INSTITUTE, PROGRESS REPORT ON PROTECTIVE SERVICES 
FOR OLDER PEOPLE 68-69 (1967). 
62. BENJAMIN ROSE INSTITUTE, supra note 59, at 157. 
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Whether one views the problem from the standpoint of ethics or 
constitutional law, it seems clear that the state must demonstrate 
some reason for depriving an elderly person of autonomy. Absent 
such a showing, disposing of the elderly by institutionalization 
violates the liberty ethic and its constitutional counterpart. Far 
from articulating the rationale, present law is premised largely on 
unexamined assumptions. Chief among these assumptions is the 
notion that involuntary process is somehow of benefit to the older 
person. When examined, the benefit appears more frequently to 
run to collateral persons. Even if benefit were generally estab­
lished, it is contended that such a benefit would not suffice to offset 
the ethical and constitutional deprivation unless the "benefited" 
person would be a bad survival risk left to his or her own devices. 
In any event, under present circumstances, diagnoses under 
which many older persons are institutionalized are vague and 
capable of misapplication. It is equally apparent that diagnoses 
are misapplied. Moreover, it is of significance that precisely the 
same group of collateral persons standing to benefit from their peti­
tion for surrogate management of the older person's property are 
also in a position to petition for institutionalization and to provide 
determinative input for the diagnosis of the need for that institu­
tionalization. There is also a predilection to incarcerate in the 
social service group which doubtlessly contributes to the level of 
involuntary placement. Finally, and most tragically, it seems nota­
ble that protective services often leading to involuntary incarcera­
tion do not prolong life but shorten it. These services appear not 
to satisfy the needs of the elderly but to aid the concerns of their 
collaterals and of institutions. 
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